“Access to Court on Pause: The Human Rights Cost of Mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution in England and Wales”

Abstract

For many people in England and Wales, the first step in a civil claim is now more likely to be a mediation appointment than a hearing before a judge. Since May 2024, large numbers of small claims have been routed into mediation as a default stage, reflecting a clear shift from encouragement to expectation. This development raises a more pressing question than whether settlement is sensible: if ADR is required before a hearing, at what point does a well intentioned step begin to impede effective access to justice?This article examined whether mandatory ADR, especially compulsory mediation, interfered with access to a court and an effective remedy in England and Wales, and what safeguards keep compulsion rights-compatible. It used doctrinal and policy analysis, focusing on the post-Churchill legal position, the strengthened procedural role of ADR, and the practical operation of compulsory small-claims mediation. The article found that the real risk is not formal exclusion from court but indirect pressure: delay, limitation anxiety, costs consequences and bargaining inequality can steer parties, particularly litigants in person, into settlements they would not freely choose. It concluded that mandatory ADR can improve access to justice only where exemptions are workable, consequences are proportionate and support is built in for weaker parties, so the route back to adjudication remains real rather than allowing mandatory ADR to operate as a quiet barrier that places access to court on pause.

1. Introduction

In England and Wales, the civil courts are sending a clear message: try to settle, and do it early. Since May 2024, many small claims have been channelized into mediation as a default step. The shift raises a simple but uncomfortable question. If you must go through ADR before a judge will hear you, is access to court still a right in practice, or has it become conditional on process compliance?

ADR is not new to the civil justice system. Since the Woolf reforms and the creation of the CPR, settlement has been treated as part of responsible litigation, not a sign of weakness. For years, the law also carried a cautionary note: courts could encourage ADR and penalize unreasonable refusal, but there was concern that forcing unwilling parties into ADR might sit uneasily with access to justice. That line has moved. Recent authority and procedural reform now reflect a more confident approach to court directed ADR, including the possibility of requiring parties to engage in non court dispute resolution where this is proportionate and does not shut the door to a judicial determination. What remains less settled is the human rights impact at ground level. A rule can preserve a hearing on paper while still shaping outcomes through delay, limitation pressure, cost, and the uneven bargaining power that is common when one party has representation and the other does not.

This article explores whether mandatory ADR, especially compulsory mediation, interferes with access to a court and an effective remedy in England and Wales. It focuses on court connected forms of compulsion rather than private arbitration clauses. The central argument is that mandatory ADR can be rights compatible where it compels participation but not settlement, preserves a real route back to adjudication, and is applied through a careful proportionality lens with sensible exemptions for cases where ADR is unsuitable.This debate matters because mandatory ADR is no longer confined to commercial disputes with evenly matched lawyers. It affects ordinary people in everyday claims, and it affects how courts allocate time, attention, and resources across the system.

The article proceeds in five steps. It first sets out the human rights and procedural framework governing access to court and court directed ADR. It then explains the legal move from encouragement to compulsion and the limits that still apply. Next, it evaluates the main ways mandatory ADR can hinder fairness in practice, including delay, pressure, and power imbalance. It then uses compulsory mediation in the small claims process as a concrete illustration of these risks and safeguards. Finally, it draws the key findings and offers targeted recommendations aimed at keeping ADR effective without making adjudication harder to reach.

2. Legal Framework

This section sets out the legal map for the argument that follows. The focus is on court connected forms of mandatory ADR in England and Wales, especially compulsory mediation, because that is where the tension with access to court is most direct. The aim is to show what the law requires, how procedure has shifted towards compulsion, and where the rights limits sit.

2.1 Constitutional and Foundational Provisions

The starting point is the right to a fair hearing, which includes practical access to a court, under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [1] The right is not absolute. Restrictions can be legitimate, but only if they pursue a proper aim, are proportionate, and do not damage the very essence of access to a judicial determination. [2] This matters for mandatory ADR because the question is practical rather than rhetorical. If ADR is imposed as a step in the process, does the person still have a real, timely route to a judge when settlement is not possible.

In domestic law, Convention rights are given effect through the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires courts and other public authorities to act compatibly with those rights. [3] Alongside this, English law also treats access to justice as a constitutional value at common law. The Supreme Court has stressed that where people cannot practically enforce legal rights, those rights become meaningless and the rule of law is undermined. [4] These foundations provide the benchmark for the later analysis. Mandatory ADR is not automatically unlawful, but it must not become a procedural hurdle that blocks effective adjudication, especially for weaker parties.

2.2 Statutory Law and Procedural Framework

There is no single statute that makes mediation compulsory across civil litigation. In practice, mandatory ADR is driven by procedural rules and court control of process rather than a standalone legislative code. The system has also been shaped by a wider policy idea, rooted in the post Woolf settlement culture, that responsible litigation includes serious attempts to resolve disputes without trial where that is realistic. [5]

The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules 2024 represent a major procedural step in that direction. They strengthen the place of ADR within the overriding objective and active case management and, most importantly, confirm an express case management power to order parties to participate in ADR. [6] These changes matter because they turn policy into clear procedural authority. They also shift the debate away from whether the court can ever require ADR and towards how the power should be exercised so that it remains fair.

A practical example of this shift is the automatic referral of many small claims money disputes to the Small Claims Mediation Service. The pilot is set out in a dedicated practice direction and applies to many small claims issued on or after 22 May 2024, with the court required to consider whether sanctions are appropriate where parties do not attend. [7] For the purposes of this article, the importance of the pilot is not simply settlement rates. It shows that compulsory mediation is no longer a theoretical possibility. It is now a lived feature of civil justice for everyday disputes.

2.3 Case Law

The modern position is best understood through three decisions that mark the movement from caution to confidence.

Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust and Steel v Joy and Halliday (2004) is the reference point for the earlier approach. The Court of Appeal confirmed that courts may encourage ADR and reflect unreasonable refusal in costs, while also expressing concern that forcing unwilling parties into mediation could obstruct access to the court. [8] For a long time, those remarks were treated as a barrier to court ordered mediation, even though the case itself was about costs consequences rather than a direct power to compel ADR.

Lomax v Lomax (2019) reflects the next step. The Court of Appeal held that the court could order early neutral evaluation without the consent of all parties as part of case management. [9] Although ENE is not mediation, it is significant because it shows the court treating structured dispute resolution as part of ordinary procedural control rather than purely voluntary bargaining.

Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council (2023) is the turning point. The Court of Appeal clarified that the court has power to stay proceedings for, or order parties to engage in, non court dispute resolution, provided the order is made in a way that remains compatible with Article 6. [10] The legality of mandatory ADR therefore depends on proportionality and practical impact, not on an absolute rule that ADR must always be voluntary.

2.4 Scholarly and Policy Commentary

Policy and scholarship explain why the system moved in this direction and why the rights debate remains alive. The Woolf reforms were driven by a diagnosis that civil litigation was too slow, too complex, and too expensive, and that settlement should be treated as a normal and responsible outcome rather than a failure to pursue justice. [5] In that environment, ADR is presented as a way to reduce delay and cost and to give parties more control over outcomes.

At the same time, a consistent concern in the literature is that compulsion can change the character of ADR. The risk is not simply being asked to attend a mediation session. It is that mandatory steps can produce pressure that falls unevenly, especially where one party is represented and the other is a litigant in person. The weaker party may feel pushed into settlement by delay, cost, uncertainty, or fear of sanctions, even where a judicial decision would be more appropriate. [5]

2.5 International Materials

Although this is a single jurisdiction article, international material still matters because Article 6 provides the rights benchmark used in England and Wales, and it is the source of the proportionality approach applied when courts regulate access to adjudication through procedure. [1] European legal materials also help identify what safeguards keep mandatory settlement steps compatible with judicial protection, such as keeping ADR non binding, avoiding substantial delay, protecting limitation periods, preventing prohibitive cost, and preserving a real route back to court if settlement fails. [5]

Taken together, the framework shows a clear shift. The law now accepts that courts can direct parties towards ADR, and the CPR has been amended to support that direction. [6] [10] The remaining question is how this power should be controlled so that it remains a tool for access to justice rather than a source of pressure, delay, and unfair settlement outcomes. That is the focus of the analysis that follows.

3. Analysis / Discussion

This section tests the legal shift towards mandatory ADR against what access to justice looks like in real disputes. The question is not whether mediation is useful. The question is what happens when it stops feeling optional and becomes a gateway that parties must pass through before they can reach a judge.

3.1 What “Mandatory ADR” Really Means in England and Wales

A lot of the heat in this debate comes from a misunderstanding. Mandatory ADR does not usually mean a party is forced to settle. It means a party is required to take part in a process designed to encourage settlement, while the formal right to trial remains available if settlement is not reached. That difference sounds neat in principle, but it matters because the human rights risk often arises not from the existence of the process, but from the way the process changes incentives and pressure.

The legal turning point is that the court’s role is no longer described as simple encouragement. In Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council (2023), the Court of Appeal made clear that courts can stay proceedings for, or order engagement in, non court dispute resolution, so long as the order does not effectively block a party from obtaining a judicial determination. [11]

That shift is now reflected in the Civil Procedure Rules themselves. Part 1 places emphasis on dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost and treats ADR as part of the modern approach to civil justice rather than a side option. [12] Part 3 reinforces this by giving the court an express case management power to order parties to engage in ADR. [13] Once ADR is built into procedure in this way, the rights question becomes unavoidable. The system must ensure that mandatory ADR does not turn into a filter that only the well advised and well resourced can comfortably pass.

3.2 The Human Rights Line: When Compulsion Becomes a Barrier

The rights line can be stated in simple terms. Article 6 protects a fair hearing, which includes practical access to a court. [14] Regulation of access is not automatically unlawful, but it has limits. The European Court has long accepted that restrictions must pursue a legitimate aim, be proportionate, and must not damage the very essence of the right of access to a court. [15]

In domestic law, these rights standards operate through the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires courts and other public authorities to act compatibly with Convention rights. [16] Alongside that statutory framework, English law also treats access to justice as a constitutional requirement at common law. In R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (2017), the Supreme Court made the point sharply: if people are prevented in practice from enforcing legal rights, the rule of law is undermined. [17]

This is why mandatory ADR has to be judged by effect, not label. It can serve legitimate aims, including reducing cost and delay and preserving court time for cases that genuinely require adjudication. But those aims only carry weight if compulsion is designed with safeguards. A rights-compatible model is more likely where ADR remains non binding, does not cause substantial delay, does not impose prohibitive cost, protects limitation positions, and preserves a clear route back to the court if settlement fails. [18]

3.3 The Human Rights Cost Part I: Delay, Limitation Pressure, and Procedural Fatigue

Delay is one of the quiet ways access to court can be placed on pause. Even a short compulsory step can stretch the timeline and change how a party behaves. The effect is not neutral. A well resourced party can absorb delay and treat it as strategy. A weaker party often cannot. Delay can mean stress, uncertainty, and the temptation to accept a poor settlement simply to end the process.

This is where the human rights argument becomes concrete. A formal right to a hearing does not guarantee fairness if the path to the hearing is shaped so that people are worn down before they get there. The risk is especially sharp in lower value disputes, where the cost of continuing can quickly feel irrational even when the legal entitlement is strong. If mandatory ADR is intended to help, it has to be deployed in a way that does not quietly transform time pressure into settlement pressure.

Limitation pressure creates the same kind of tilt. If a claimant fears time is running out, or does not understand whether the process protects their position, they may settle for less than their legal entitlement to avoid the risk of losing everything. This is not a theoretical problem. It is a predictable outcome when procedure becomes complex for those without advice.

3.4 The Human Rights Cost Part II: Cost Barriers, Sanctions, and Coercion by Consequence

Mandatory ADR is often defended as a cheaper alternative to trial, and in many cases that is true. But cost enters the picture in two different ways. There is the cost of participating, including time off work, childcare, preparation, and the hidden cost of not having legal advice. There is also the cost of refusing ADR, or being seen as refusing it, through the risk of financial consequences later.

The CPR now makes the link between ADR behaviour and costs explicit. When deciding costs, the court must consider conduct, including whether a party failed to comply with an order for ADR or unreasonably failed to engage in ADR. [19] That is a powerful lever. Used carefully, it discourages tactical refusal and rewards sensible cooperation. Used bluntly, it can create coercion by consequence, especially for litigants in person who may not understand what counts as reasonable engagement or who have genuine reasons for believing ADR is unsuitable.

The line between encouraging settlement and forcing settlement can blur without anyone saying the words “you must settle.” If the practical message becomes “settle or risk financial punishment,” the choice is no longer a free one. Rights-compatible practice therefore depends on clarity and proportionality, and on courts being willing to treat justified refusal as a legitimate position rather than misconduct.

3.5 The Human Rights Cost Part III: Power Imbalance, Litigants in Person, and Information Gaps

The most serious human rights cost is inequality. ADR is often described as empowering because parties control the outcome. But that assumes the parties enter the process on roughly equal footing. In many disputes, one party has legal advice, experience, and confidence, while the other is a litigant in person with limited ability to value the claim or test the other side’s assertions.

The unfairness shows up in subtle ways. A represented party can frame the dispute, present settlement as the only sensible route, and use delay and risk language to steer the outcome. A litigant in person may confuse the pressure of the process with the weakness of the case. Outcomes can look consensual while being driven by imbalance. Any serious mandatory ADR system therefore has to treat information, suitability, and vulnerability as central, not as an afterthought.

3.6 Case Study Anchor: Compulsory Mediation in the Small Claims Process

The small claims compulsory mediation model is a useful test because it makes the abstract debate concrete. Under the pilot scheme in Practice Direction 51ZE, many small claims are referred automatically for mediation, and the court is directed to consider whether sanctions should be applied for non attendance. [20] The policy case is clear. If low value claims can be resolved quickly through a short mediation, court time is saved and parties may get closure faster.

The Ministry of Justice has presented the reform in exactly those terms, including the claim that embedding mediation into the process will free up court capacity for more complex disputes. [21] A free, short, accessible scheme has a stronger claim to proportionality than expensive private mediation in complex litigation. In that sense, small claims compulsory mediation may represent the best version of mandatory ADR.

But rights risks still remain. Not every dispute is suitable for mediation at the same stage, particularly where disclosure or expert evidence is needed before meaningful negotiation is possible. A free service can still create pressure if people believe refusal will be punished or if the process feels like a gate-keeping obstacle and because small claims involve many litigants in person, inequality and information gaps remain the central problem. A scheme can be proportionate at the system level and still produce unfair outcomes for particular people if safeguards are not actively applied.

3.7 Key Takeaways from the Analysis

Mandatory ADR is not inherently incompatible with access to court, and there are strong policy reasons for embedding ADR into civil justice. But the human rights cost becomes real when compulsion produces delay, settlement pressure, and unequal outcomes, especially for litigants in person. The decisive question is whether the system preserves a realistic route back to adjudication and whether safeguards are strong enough to prevent mandatory ADR from turning into compulsory compromise.

4. Comparative Perspective

This section offers a limited comparative perspective to support the central argument. It does not attempt a global survey. Instead, it focuses on how selected jurisdictions have introduced mandatory mediation while seeking to preserve meaningful access to adjudication, and on the practical lessons this provides for England and Wales.

4.1 Comparison with Italy and Canada

Italy and Ontario (Canada) are useful comparators because they represent two different legal traditions with a similar policy move. Both have built mandatory mediation into ordinary civil procedure, but they justify and control it in slightly different ways.

4.2 Italy and Canada: The Legal Position

Italy’s approach is shaped by European requirements of effective judicial protection. In Alassini and Others (2010), the Court of Justice accepted that making an out of court settlement step a condition for bringing proceedings can be compatible with access to the courts where it does not impose a binding outcome, does not cause substantial delay, allows urgent interim measures, and keeps the route back to litigation open in practice. [22] In Menini and Rampanelli (2017), the Court took the same idea into a mandatory mediation setting and treated “voluntariness” as meaning control of the process and the ability to leave it, not an absolute freedom to avoid ADR altogether. The key is that the person’s right to go to court must be maintained in a practical sense. [23]

Ontario shows the common law version of mandatory, court connected mediation. Rule 24.1 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure provides for mandatory mediation in specified civil actions, with the stated aim of reducing cost and delay and supporting early and fair resolution. It sets tight timelines for when mediation should occur and allows the court to exempt a case where mediation is inappropriate. [24] The programme is presented as a permanent reform tool rather than a one off experiment, with mediation treated as a routine stage of managed litigation. [25]

4.3 Lessons for England and Wales

Two lessons are most relevant. First, mandatory ADR is most defensible when the safeguards are concrete rather than rhetorical: clear timelines, easy access, non binding outcomes, and reliable exemptions for unsuitable cases. Second, “keeping the court door open” has to mean more than formal availability. It must mean that parties can reach a judge without being worn down by delay, pressured by consequences, or disadvantaged by lack of information.

5. Findings/Observations

Based on the framework and analysis above, the following findings emerge.In England and Wales, mandatory ADR is now best understood as a case management tool rather than a purely voluntary choice. After Churchill v Merthyr (2023), the key question is no longer whether the court can direct parties towards ADR, but whether the direction is controlled in a way that preserves meaningful access to a judicial determination.

The legal limit is practical, not rhetorical. Article 6 permits regulation of access, but it does not permit measures that impair the very essence of the right. That essence based test, combined with the domestic constitutional emphasis on access to justice, requires the system to look beyond formal availability and focus on real world effects.The main “human rights cost” of compulsory ADR arises through pressure rather than formal exclusion. Delay, cost burdens, and the fear of consequences can push parties towards compromise even where adjudication is needed, especially when costs discretion is used to penalize non engagement.

Compulsory mediation in the small claims process shows why proportionality depends on design. A low cost, accessible scheme may be justified, but the risk concentrates where disputes are unsuitable for early mediation and where litigants in person face information and bargaining disadvantages.Other jurisdictions show that mandatory ADR is more defensible when safeguards are concrete and predictable, including clear timelines, meaningful exemptions, and an unchanged route back to court. Those safeguards are not optional extras; they are what keeps compulsion compatible with access to justice.

This article’s contribution is to turn the abstract rights standard into a practical test for courts and policymakers. It pinpoints how mandatory ADR can undermine fairness in real disputes and sets out the safeguards most likely to ensure that “mandatory participation” does not slide into “compulsory compromise”.

6. Conclusion & Recommendations

This article set out to examine whether mandatory ADR, particularly compulsory mediation, interferes with access to a court and an effective remedy in England and Wales, and to identify the limits that keep compulsion rights compatible.

The analysis shows that the legal debate has moved on. After Churchill and the recent procedural reforms, the question is not whether courts may direct parties towards ADR, but whether they do so in a way that preserves meaningful access to a judicial determination. Mandatory ADR can support access to justice where it compels participation rather than settlement and where it is applied proportionately. The human rights risk arises when compulsion operates through pressure.Delay, limitation anxiety, costs consequences, and bargaining inequality can turn a formal right to a hearing into a practical push towards compromise, especially for litigants in person. The small claims scheme illustrates the point: low cost and accessibility strengthen the case for mandatory mediation, but only if exemptions and protections are real in practice.

Three reforms follow from the analysis.First, courts should apply a clear proportionality checklist before ordering ADR, focusing on suitability, urgency, and inequality between the parties.Second, exemption routes should be simple and predictable, with special attention to vulnerability and information gaps.Third, consequences for non engagement should remain targeted at genuine unreasonableness, not used as a blunt tool that pressures settlement.

Future research should test mandatory mediation empirically, including how often exemptions are granted, how sanctions are used, and whether outcomes differ for represented parties and litigants in person.If these safeguards are treated as core features rather than optional add ons, mandatory ADR can support access to justice. Without them, it risks placing access to court on pause.

7. Bibliography

[1] European Convention on Human Rights (official English text). https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG 

[2] Ashingdane v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528 (ECtHR), judgment (PDF). https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57425 

[3] Human Rights Act 1998. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents 

[4] R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, judgment (PDF). https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2015_0233_judgment_d0f3da86aa.pdf 

[5] ADR Subject Guide, University of London (UGLaws VLE, Topic 2: ADR v litigation, moving towards compulsory ADR). Course material (no public link).

[6] The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules 2024 (SI 2024/839). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2024/839/contents/made 

[7] Practice Direction 51ZE, Small Claims Track, Automatic Referral to Mediation Pilot Scheme. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part51/practice-direction-51ze-small-claims-track-automatic-referral-to-mediation-pilot-scheme 

[8] Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust and Steel v Joy and Halliday [2004] EWCA Civ 576. https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/576.html 

[9] Lomax v Lomax [2019] EWCA Civ 1467. https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/1467.html 

[10] Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416 (judgment page with PDF download). https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/james-churchill-v-merthyr-tydfil-county-borough-council/ 

[11] Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416 (judgment page with PDF download). https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/james-churchill-v-merthyr-tydfil-county-borough-council/

[12] Civil Procedure Rules, Part 1 (Overriding Objective and Court’s Duty to Manage Cases) (as amended). https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part01

[13] Civil Procedure Rules, Part 3 (The Court’s Case Management Powers) (rule 3.1(2)(o): order parties to engage in ADR). https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part03

[14] European Convention on Human Rights (official English text). https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG

[15] Ashingdane v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528 (ECtHR), judgment. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57425

[16] Human Rights Act 1998. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents

[17] R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, judgment (PDF). https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2015_0233_judgment_d0f3da86aa.pdf

[18] Civil Justice Council, Compulsory ADR (July 2021) (report). https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Civil-Justice-Council-Compulsory-ADR-report.pdf

[19] Civil Procedure Rules, Part 44 (Costs) (rule 44.2(5)(e): ADR non-compliance / unreasonable failure to engage). https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part-44-general-rules-about-costs

[20] Practice Direction 51ZE, Small Claims Track, Automatic Referral to Mediation Pilot Scheme. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part51/practice-direction-51ze-small-claims-track-automatic-referral-to-mediation-pilot-scheme

[21] Ministry of Justice, ‘Faster resolution for small claims as mediation baked into courts process’ (22 May 2024). https://www.gov.uk/government/news/faster-resolution-for-small-claims-as-mediation-baked-into-courts-process

[22] Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Rosalba Alassini and Others v Telecom Italia SpA and Others (Judgment of 18 March 2010).  ECLI:EU:C:2010:146 (PDF). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=ecli%3AECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2010%3A146

[23] Case C-75/16, Livio Menini and Maria Antonia Rampanelli v Banco Popolare – Società Cooperativa (Judgment of 14 June 2017).  ECLI:EU:C:2017:457 (PDF). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A62016CJ0075

[24] Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24.1 Mandatory Mediation (PDF). https://www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/files/archive/civil-rules/Rule24_1-EN.pdf

[25] Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program (Rules 24.1 and 75.1). https://cfcj-fcjc.org/inventory-of-reforms/ontario-mandatory-mediation-program-rules-24-1-and-75-1/